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Empathy and Human Rights: the Case of Religious Dress  
 
Peter Cumper* and Tom Lewis** 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In To Kill a Mockingbird, Harper Lee’s classic 1960 novel about racism in the deep 
south of the USA, the lawyer Atticus Finch explains to his six year old daughter the 
benefits of adopting the perspectives of other people: 
 
‘… if you can learn a simple trick Scout, you’ll get on better with all kinds of 
folks.  You never really understand a person until you consider things from his 
point of view – … – until you climb into his skin and walk around in it.’1 
 
A more eloquent yet simple encapsulation of the concept of empathy is hard to find. 
Just as empathy – or the process of ‘‘feeling with’ another’2 – was seen by Harper Lee 
as a way of challenging racial prejudice in a conservative US town, so too will it be 
argued here that the principle of empathy offers significant opportunities for a better 
understanding of difference in a socially fragmented Europe. 
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1 Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird (Vintage, 2004) at 31.  
2 This definition of empathy is offered by Eisenberg and Strayer, ‘Critical issues in the study of 
empathy’ in Eisenberg and Strayer (eds) Empathy and its Development (Cambridge University 
Press,1990) 5.  
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The concept of empathy has ‘a long and checkered history’,3 and in recent 
decades it has been of particular interest to scholars from across a range of academic 
disciplines4 − such as those working in the fields of neuroscience,5 evolutionary 
biology,6 psychology,7 ethics,8 philosophy9 and history.10 This recent focus on 
empathy has even been so striking that one leading commentator has referred to it as 
an ‘empathy craze’.11 However, in spite of the seemingly near ubiquitous infiltration 
of empathy studies across academic and popular discourses, there has, perhaps 
surprisingly, been little utilization of this concept in the area of European human 
rights law. Although some notable philosophers and legal scholars have argued that 
empathy may offer assistance in providing an understanding of why human rights are 
worthy of protection, and there has been debate about the role of empathy in the 
                                                 
3 Moore, ‘The origins and development of empathy’ (1990) 14(2) Motivation and Emotion 75. 
4 For a range of disciplinary perspectives see Coplan and Goldie (eds) Empathy (Oxford University 
Press, 2011). A general overview of ‘empathy’ is also to be found in Howe, Empathy: what it is and 
why it matters (Palgrave Macmillan 2013).   
5 See e.g. Iacoboni, Mirroring People: the science of empathy and how we connect with others 
(Picador, 2008); and Decety and Ickes, The Social Neuroscience of Empathy (Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology Press, 2011). 
6 See e.g. de Waal, The Age of Empathy (Souvenir Press, 2009); and Sober and Wilson, Unto Others: 
the Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behaviour (Harvard University Press, 1998). 
7 See e.g. Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: a History of Violence and Humanity (Penguin, 
2012); Baron-Cohen, Zero Degrees of Empathy: A New Theory of Human Cruelty (Allen Lane, 2011); 
Trout, Why Empathy Matters: The Science and Psychology of Better Judgment (Penguin, 2010); and 
Perry and Salavitz, Born for Love: Why Empathy is Essential (and Endangered) (Harper Collins, 
2010); Krznaric, Empathy: why it matters and how to get it (Rider, 2014). 
8 See e.g. Kitcher, The Ethical Project (Harvard University Press, 2011); and Armstrong, Twelve Steps 
to a Compassionate Life (Vintage, 2010).  
9 See e.g. Nakao and Itakura, ‘An integrated view of empathy: psychology, philosophy, and 
neuroscience’ (2009) 43(1) Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42-52. 
10 See e.g. Moyn, ‘Empathy in history, empathizing with humanity’ (2006) 45(3) History and Theory 
397-415 and Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (Jonathan Cape, 1999).  
11 Pinker, supra n 7, at 695. 
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context of US constitutional rights,12 there has been little exploration as to how an 
empathic approach might work in the actual practice of human rights adjudication.  
In this article we seek to address this situation by investigating the possibility 
that empathy might offer more to the adjudication of human rights disputes than has 
hitherto been recognised. With this aim in mind we propose to explore empathy 
through the prism of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the 
Court or ECtHR) in its application of the qualified rights contained in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). We shall focus specifically on the Article 9 
case law concerning the right to manifest one’s faith or beliefs through religious dress 
or related symbols, though our arguments may well have applicability in relation to 
other issues of contemporary controversy.13 The Court’s jurisprudence in the area of 
religious dress/symbols has been the subject of widespread academic criticism, 
particularly on account of the very weak protection that it has provided to Muslim 
women and girls wishing to manifest their beliefs through the wearing of the 
headscarf or face veil.  As such this topic provides a valuable case study as to how the 
                                                 
12 See e.g. Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’ reprinted in Savic (ed), The Politics 
of Human Rights (Verso, 1999) 67; Gearty, The Hamlyn Lectures 2005: Can Human Rights Survive? 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) ch 2; Gearty, ‘Human rights: the necessary quest for foundations’ 
in Douzinas and Gearty, The Meanings of Rights: The philosophy and social theory of human rights 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014), 21; and Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights as Idolatry’ in Gutman (ed), 
Michael Ignatieff – Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton University Press, 2003) 53 at 88-
9. For explorations of empathy in the context of US constitutional law and rights see e.g. Henderson, 
‘Legality and Empathy’ (1987) 85 Michigan Law Review, 1574; Hoffman, ‘Empathy Justice and Law’ 
in Coplan and Goldie, supra n 4; Bandes, ‘Moral Imagination in Judging’ (2011) Washburn Law 
Journal 1; Corso, ‘Should Empathy Play any Role in the Interpretation of Constitutional Rights’ (2014) 
27(1) Ratio Juris 94.  
13 The concept of empathy might provide valuable insights in areas that range, for example, from 
workplace disputes whereby conservative faith and LGBT rights are pitted against each other, to the 
contentious issue of ‘blasphemy’ and the public vilification of sacred religious images, figures or 
doctrines. 
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promotion of empathy might assist in the determination of increasingly frequent, 
acrimonious and socially damaging disputes. 
The essence of our argument is that the Court has failed meaningfully to 
acknowledge the deep commitments that manifestations of religion/belief may 
represent from the perspective of believers themselves. This has had the effect, 
through the margin of appreciation doctrine, of less onerous standards being imposed 
on states in terms of the reasons they must adduce to justify imposing curbs on the 
right to freedom of religion/belief.  In short, when the Court has struck the balance 
between the individual’s right to manifest their religion/belief as against the 
competing interests claimed by the state, more weight has consistently been added to 
the ‘restrictions-side’ than to the ‘rights side’ of the scales, with a consequent tilting 
in the state’s favour.   
It will be argued that this impoverished protection matters because human 
rights depend for their legitimacy on the claim that they afford equal protection to all. 
The routine failure of applicants who wish to manifest their faith through how they 
dress may lead to the disillusionment of certain religious minorities with the 
Strasbourg human rights system. Moreover, it means that religious believers risk 
being marginalized when a human rights Convention that grandly ‘talks the talk’ of 
offering equal protection to all conspicuously fails to do so − thereby prompting 
consternation in some quarters of a striking contrast between the worthy rhetoric of 
human rights protection in theory, and its paltry implementation in practice. Such a 
state of affairs is obviously problematic, especially at a time when differences relating 
to religion evidently lie at the very heart of strained community relations in parts of 
Europe. To date, instead of working to alleviate the sense of alienation felt by some 
people of faith, it would seem that, in relation to its jurisprudence in the area of 
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religious dress, the ECtHR risks being accused of actually compounding it. However, 
this need not necessarily be so, and in this article we investigate a possible ‘way back’ 
for the Court. This is for the ECtHR to rely less on the margin of appreciation, and to 
interrogate the relevant issues more vigorously by displaying a fresh willingness to 
‘stand in the shoes’ of those who wish to manifest their faith through the religious 
attire of their choice. It is our contention that were the Court to espouse an approach 
in its reasoning based on the universal value of empathy, progress could be made in 
helping to resolve problems in this most emotive and contentious of areas. 
 This article adopts the following structure. In Part 2 we provide a short 
introduction to the concept of empathy. In Part 3, we briefly set out the relevant 
aspects of the balancing methodology employed by the ECtHR when adjudicating on 
qualified rights, with particular reference to Article 9 of the ECHR and its case law on 
religious dress/symbols.14 Then, in Part 4 we return to concept of empathy, with 
analysis of the potential benefits of relying on such a commonly shared value in a 
continent that is deeply divided on questions of religion/belief. In Part 5 we provide 
suggestions as to how the ECtHR might actually go about taking an empathic turn in 
its case law on religious dress.  Finally, in the conclusion, the key arguments are 
summarized and the case for empathy is briefly restated. 
  
2.  EMPATHY: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
                                                 
14 Given the wealth of existing scholarship on religious dress and Article 9, our coverage of this area 
will be brief.  See e.g. McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion: the Islamic Headscarf Debate in 
Europe (Hart, 2006); Vakulenko, Islamic Veiling in Legal Discourse (Routledge, 2012); and Howard, 
Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European bans on the wearing of symbols in education 
(Routledge, 2012).  
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A. Perspective Taking: Empathy, Sympathy, Compassion15 
 
A number of arguments have been advanced in recent years about the centrality of 
empathy to human behaviour.16 Claims have, for example, been made that the ability 
of people to identify with the pleasures and pains of others has contributed 
significantly to the growth of the civilizing process.17 Similarly, evolutionary 
biologists and psychologists have observed that the traits and skills of communal 
living have increased our ability to see the world from other people’s perspectives, 
while the laws of nature demonstrate that it is an invaluable skill for both the hunter 
and hunted to be able put themselves in the minds of (respectively) prey or predator, 
so as to more effectively predict the other’s actions.18  What is more, recent 
developments in neuroscience have revealed evidence of so called ‘mirror neurons’ in 
the brain, which, it has been argued, provide a physical, biological basis for empathic 
behavior.19 Thus, the ability of humans to empathize with each other is an important 
component of social existence. What, then, is actually meant by this concept of 
‘empathy’? 
                                                 
15 Whilst use is made here of the term ‘empathy’, it is acknowledged that there are debates amongst 
philosophers and psychologists as to the precise meaning of, and relationship between, empathy and 
related concepts such as ‘compassion’, ‘sympathy’, ‘theory of the mind’ and ‘perspective taking’. See 
Coplan and Goldie supra n 4. 
16 See references at supra n 4-10.  
17 See Pinker supra n 7. The classic work in this context is Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics, 
Evolution and Moral Progress (1981) (Princeton University Press, 2011). 
18 There is a debate about the extent to which other species can exhibit empathy. See de Waal, supra n 
6. 
19 See Iacoboni, supra n 5. These claims have, however, been subject to criticism. See e.g. Hickok, 
‘Eight problems for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding in monkeys and humans’ (2009) 
21 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 1229. 
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The noun empathy has its roots in the German einfuhlung or ‘feeling into’, and 
was only coined in English in the early twentieth century. Its etymology lies in the 
Greek empatheia, meaning to enter feelings from the outside or to be with a person’s 
feelings.20 It originally had a very mechanistic sense – projection − but the term in 
modern English has taken on a spectrum of meanings.21 These range from ‘cognitive 
empathy’ or an awareness of another person’s feelings, through to ‘affective 
empathy’ − not only seeing the world from another’s perspective, but also feeling 
what they feel.22 A helpful analysis is provided by Martha Nussbaum, who likens 
empathic skill to that employed by the Method actor, for it involves a participatory 
enactment of the situation of the sufferer being combined with awareness that one is 
not actually the sufferer.  For empathy one must thus be aware ‘both of the bad lot of 
the sufferer and of the fact that it is, right now, not one’s own’ because ‘if one really 
had the experience of feeling the pain in one’s own body then one would precisely 
have failed to comprehend the pain of another as other’.23 However, Nussbaum points 
out that one can feel empathy without having an emotional response. In other words, 
one may have the ability to empathize with one’s enemy, and use it as a way of 
predicting their moves or manipulating them. Equally, one may empathize with 
another to whom one refuses compassion on the grounds of fault – so, for example, a 
juror may understand the experience of a criminal defendant without having 
compassion for the person’s plight, if one believes them to be both responsible and 
                                                 
20 See Coplan and Goldie, supra n 4 at xii; and Howe, supra n 4 at 9. 
21 See Battaly, ‘Is Empathy a Virtue?’ in Coplan and Goldie, supra n 4 at 277; and Howe, supra n 4 at 
8-19. 
22 Hoffman, ‘Empathy Justice and Law’ in Coplan and Goldie, supra n 4 at 231.  See also Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of thought: the intelligence of emotions’ (Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 301; and 
Corso, supra n 12 at 95-100. 
23 Nussbaum ibid. at 329. 
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guilty.24  The core idea that we wish to capture and develop in the discussion to follow 
is the capacity of human beings to take the perspective of others – and for the sake of 
concision we shall use the term ‘empathy’ to this end. 
 
B. Empathy and the Scottish Enlightenment: Hume and Smith 
 
Whilst the term ‘empathy’ may be of relatively recent origin, the concept and its 
importance have been recognized for centuries. The philosophers of the eighteenth 
century Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume and Adam Smith (using the term 
‘sympathy’) both stressed its importance in human affairs. Hume, for example, argued 
that because people are constituted similarly and often have common life experiences, 
imagining oneself in another’s place converts the other’s situation into mental images 
that evoke the same feelings in oneself.25 Accordingly, Hume maintained that: 
 
No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its 
consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to 
receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different 
from, or even contrary to our own.26 
 
Adam Smith, in his 1759 Theory of Moral Sentiments, explored the concept more 
deeply: 
 
                                                 
24 Nussbaum ibid. 
25 Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) (Liberal Arts Press, 1957). 
26 Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature (1793 ) (Digireads.com Publishing, 2010) at 178. 
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As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no 
idea of the manner in which they are affected but by conceiving what we 
ourselves should feel in the like situation.  Though our brother is upon the 
rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us 
of what he suffers… By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, 
we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into 
his body, and become in some measure the same person with him and thence 
form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though 
weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.27   
 
These insights of Hume and Smith represent an early recognition of the fact that 
empathy enables us to open the door to acknowledge the humanity and dignity of 
other human beings.  As such they provide a glimpse at how the taking of another’s 
perspective, and the sense of why harmful things ought not to be done to that other, 
are connected at a deep, intuitive level. 
 
C. Empathy and the origins of the human rights 
 
The historian Lynn Hunt has argued that the recognition of contemporary human 
rights norms can be traced back to an extension of the circle of empathy over the 
course of the eighteenth century.28 Although it is often assumed that modern human 
                                                 
27 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiment (1759) (Haakonssen ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
at 11.  Compare this explanation – where one actually thinks oneself to be the suffer – with the 
‘Method actor’ analogy used by Nussbaum, supra n 23, where one is always aware that one is not the 
sufferer. 
28 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights (Norton, 2008).  For critique see Moyn, ‘On the Genealogy of 
Morals’ in Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History (Verso, 2014) 1. 
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rights originated in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, Hunt maintains that the 
acceptance of human rights, and its gathering of momentum as a force for change, 
depended equally upon emotions.29 In other words, for autonomous individuals to 
become members of a political community based on their independent moral 
judgments, they had to be able to empathize with others and, as Hunt explains, all 
people could have rights only if everyone could be seen as being in ‘some 
fundamental way alike’.30 In this context Hunt argues that an especially important 
element in the growth of human rights in the eighteenth century was the rise of the 
epistolary novel − a novel in the form of a letter − since, with this genre, the story is 
told in the character’s own words and it exposes the character’s thoughts and feelings 
as they are read by the reader, rather than at a distance as is the case with a narrator. 
Reading such novels developed readers’ faculties to put themselves imaginatively in 
the position of people very different from themselves in terms of social status, race 
and gender. As a result the capacity of readers to empathize across traditional 
boundaries was developed and, as Hunt puts it, they ‘came to see others − people they 
did not know personally − as [being] like them [with] the same kinds of inner 
emotions’.31  
This ability of people to empathize with even complete strangers has been 
enhanced in recent decades by the advent of a multi-media culture. For example, the 
psychologist Steven Pinker has argued that, in the course of the last century, the 
                                                 
29 Hunt, ibid. at 26. 
30 Ibid. at 27. 
31 Ibid. at 39-40.  Subsequent centuries provide many examples of novels or memoirs revealing the 
plight of oppressed groups, and leading to widespread opposition to oppressive practices. Famously in 
the nineteenth century novels such as Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin helped to mobilize 
the abolitionist movement in the United States, see: Pinker, supra n 7 at 213; Hoffman, supra n 22 at 
246.  
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growth of television, cinema and the world-wide-web has been responsible for 
‘expanding empathy … by getting people into the habit of straying from their 
parochial vantage points’.32 This, he argues, has been one of the crucial factors in the 
‘civilizing process’33 and the ‘rights revolutions’ of the modern age.34  After all, one 
need only think of the profound social and political consequences of well publicized 
images of conflict, such as the shocking recent pictures of a three year old boy (Aylan 
Kurdi) who drowned in the attempt to reach Europe from war torn Syria35 − an image 
that reportedly left the British Prime Minister feeling ‘deeply moved’,36 had a 
significant effect on immigration policy in Germany,37 and ‘dragged the Syrian 
exodus out of anonymity’.38 
As scholars such as Lynn Hunt and Steven Pinker demonstrate, it may well be 
that the widening of the circle of empathy has played a significant role in the origins 
and historical growth of human rights. But the question remains, to what extent can 
the notion of empathy contribute to the resolution of contemporary human rights 
                                                 
32 Pinker, supra n 7 at 213.   
33 Pinker, supra n 7 at ch 3. 
34 Pinker, supra n 7 at ch 7. 
35 See Smith, ‘Shocking images of Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees’ The Guardian, 2 
September 2015 available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-
drowned-syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees [last accessed 14 December 2017].  Such images 
also include the famous photograph of a naked girl, taken during the Vietnam war, screaming in agony 
from napalm burns. See Hariman and Lucaites, ‘Public Identity and Collective Memory in US Iconic 
Photography: The Image of ‘Accidental Napalm’’ (2003) 20(1) Critical Studies in Media 
Communication 35. 
36 See ‘Cameron: Deeply moved by photos of drowned Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi’, ITV News, 3 
September 2015  http://www.itv.com/news/update/2015-09-03/cameron-britain-will-fulfil-its-moral-
responsibilities/ [last accessed 14 December 2017].   
37 Holmes and Castaneda, ‘Representing the “European refugee crisis” in Germany and beyond: 
Deservingness and difference, life and death’ (2016) 43(1) American Ethnologist 12. 
38 de-Andres, Nos-Aldas, and García-Matilla, ‘The Transformative Image. The Power of a Photograph 
for Social Change: The Death of Aylan’ (2016) 47 Comunicar 29. 
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claims? It is to this issue that we now turn, focusing on the Article 9 religious dress 
case law of the ECtHR. 
 
3.  THE RELIGIONS DRESS CASES, BALANCING AND THE MARGIN 
OF APPRECIATION 
 
Few issues in contemporary Europe are as controversial as that of the public display 
of certain forms of religious attire. For those who find themselves subject to curbs on 
what they can wear, redress is often sought before the ECtHR. Yet whilst the Court is 
charged with interpreting Article 9 of the ECHR which guarantees the ‘right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion’, and the ‘right to manifest religion or 
belief’, the protection accorded by the ECtHR to those claiming violations of this 
‘right to manifest’ has often been weak.39 This paucity of protection has been 
especially evident in cases where Muslim women and girls have faced restrictions on 
wearing the headscarf or face veil.  Despite multiple applications to the ECtHR over 
the last two decades, not a single such claimant has been successful. Moreover, in this 
context the contrast with other ECHR rights – such as political and journalistic 
expression (under Article 10), and sexual privacy (under Article 8), where claimants 
have enjoyed far greater levels of success – is striking.  
 
A. Article 9 ECHR 
 
                                                 
39 Lorenzo Zucca comments that the ‘status of [the right to freedom of religion] among other human 
rights is limited as a matter of practice’: Zucca, ‘Freedom of Religion in a Secular World’ in Cruft, 
Liao and Renzo, Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2015) 388 at 
402. 
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Along with Articles 8 (private and family life), 10 (expression) and 11 (assembly and 
association), Article 9 of the Convention is a qualified right. Whilst Article 9(1) 
provides that the internal sphere of privately held ‘thought, conscience and religion’ 
has absolute protection from intrusion, manifestations of ‘religion or belief’ may be 
legitimately subject to restrictions under Article 9(2).40 Any restrictions that are 
imposed under Article 9(2) must satisfy three criteria. They must be: ‘prescribed by 
law’; in pursuance of one of the listed legitimate aims (i.e. in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals etc); and ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’,41 which means that any restriction must be ‘proportionate’ to the 
particular aim being pursued.42 
The structure of Article 9 requires that the ECtHR perform a balancing 
exercise, weighing the exercise of the right on one side of the metaphorical scales 
against the public interest reasons for restriction on the other. The Court has often said 
that ‘inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the 
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual’s human rights’.43 This notion of balancing fundamental 
                                                 
40 Article 9 of the ECHR provides: 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
41 This is in common with ECHR Articles 8, 10 and 11. 
42 See Manoussakis and Others v Greece Application No 18748/91, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 26 
September 1996 at para 44. 
43 See e.g. Soering v UK Application No 14038/88, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 7 July 1989 at para 89; 
Hatton v UK Application No 36022/97 Merits and Just Satisfaction, 8 July 2003 at para 98; and 
Chassagnou and Others v France Application No 25988/94, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 29 April 
1999 at para 113.  
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rights against competing interests is controversial, not least because of the 
incommensurable nature of the things being ‘weighed’, and the risk of arbitrariness, 
with judges allocating values to differing interests which might simply reflect their 
own moral and political views.44 We do not here take sides in this controversy. Rather 
our stance is that, as a matter of practical legal reality and under the text of the ECHR, 
most human rights (and certainly the right to manifest religion or belief) have to be 
‘balanced’ against competing considerations. Balancing is expressly part of the 
adjudicative process and, as such, requires weight to be placed on alternate sides of 
the metaphorical scales.  
 The margin of appreciation (MoA) has come to be a crucial aspect of that 
point of analysis at which the ECtHR weighs, in the balance, the exercise of the right 
against competing interests. The MoA is a doctrine of judicial self-restraint that vests 
a certain amount of discretion (subject to European supervision) in the actions and 
policies of the state in regard to Convention rights.45 The Court’s jurisdiction is thus 
‘supervisory’ in nature, with the primary task of protecting human rights, as well as 
deciding what restrictions on the exercise of a Convention right are justified, 
remaining with domestic authorities.46  
                                                 
44 For a full range of commentary on the arguments for and against balancing, see the essays in 
Huscroft, Miller and Webber, Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
45 For criticism of the MoA see e.g. Arai-Takehashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the 
Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia, 2002) at 1; Letsas, A 
Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 
2010) at 80; and Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) at 357. 
46 See Handyside v UK Application No 5493/72, Merits, 7 December 1976 at para 48, in which the 
Court points out that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the 
national systems safeguarding human rights, and the responsibility of ‘securing’ Convention rights and 
of making the assessment of what restrictions are necessary is primarily for states. Article 1 of the 
ECHR requires states to ‘secure’ the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. 
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The MoA has been utilised particularly in cases involving difficult and 
sensitive issues where the ECtHR considers that it is appropriate to defer to the 
domestic authorities.47 The most prevalent use of the doctrine has been under Articles 
8, 9, 10 and 11, at the point at which the Court assesses whether the interference with 
the protected right under paragraph 2 is proportionate to the legitimate aim being 
pursued. The doctrine means that the state is given a degree of leeway as to how this 
balance should be struck. To return to the balancing metaphor, the MoA essentially 
leads to less weight being placed on the rights-side, and more being placed on the 
limitations-side of the balance.  
The width of the MoA accorded by the ECtHR varies considerably because it 
depends on the subject matter of the right claimed and the asserted reasons for the 
state’s restriction of it. In areas where a pan-European consensus exists, derived from 
a clear conceptualization of the reasons for protecting the right, the MoA is typically 
very narrow.48 For example, the margin granted to states where forms of free 
expression that serve the public interest risk being curbed has tended to be limited.49 
The importance to democracy of these kinds of expression is clearly understood, and 
it is generally accepted that, say, freedom of political and journalistic expression is 
                                                 
47 For example a ‘wide’ MoA has commonly been accorded in situations where states have issued 
derogations from their human rights obligations on occasions such as a ‘public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation’ under Article 15 of the ECHR. 
48 The method by which the existence of a European consensus is ascertained is itself a highly disputed 
matter. See e.g. the partly dissenting opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom in SAS v France 
Application No 43835/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 1 July 2014, at para 19. See further, Wildhaber, 
Hjartason and Donnelly, ‘No Consensus on Consensus? The Practice of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2013) 33 Human Rights Law Journal 248. 
49 See e.g. The Sunday Times v United Kingdom Application No 6538/74, Merits, 26 April 1975. 
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vital to the democratic process.50 The strong and oft-repeated view of the ECtHR is 
thus that the free exercise of political and journalistic expression is a sine qua non of 
democracy, and that ‘freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of a 
democratic society which prevails throughout the Convention’.51 These are the clear 
foundations upon which a European consensus can be identified and the latitude 
granted to states in such areas as to how they strike the balance between an 
individual’s right under Article 10(1), and the countervailing interest in Article 10(2), 
has consequently been limited. This approach has meant that, for example, bans on 
demonstrators wearing the Communist five-pointed red star at a political meeting,52 
and curbs on minority religious groups securing official recognition,53 have been 
successfully challenged on account of their connection to core democratic values such 
as the right to freedom of political expression and freedom of association.  
To revisit the balancing metaphor, there is ample and readily available weight 
to be placed on the ‘rights-side’ of the scales in such cases, for there are clear benefits 
to be derived from the strong protection of the ‘right’ – i.e. the maintenance of 
political democracy upon which the very protection of human rights is contingent. 
This means that when it comes to the state seeking to impose curbs on certain rights, 
its actions are justified by reference to clear and specific criteria – and that in relation 
to certain fundamental rights or constitutional principles, there is effectively more of a 
                                                 
50 The ECHR preamble states that ‘fundamental freedoms ... are best maintained on the one hand by 
effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the 
human rights on which they depend’. 
51 Lingens v Austria Application No 9815/82, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 8 July 1986 at para 42. See 
Mowbray, ‘Contemporary Aspects of the Promotion of democracy by the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2014) 20(3) European Public Law 469.  
52 See Vajnai v Hungary Application No 33629/06, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 8 July 2008 at para 51. 
53 See e.g. Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v Russia Application No 72881/01, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 24 June 2004 at para 61; Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház v Hungary Application 
No 70945/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 8 April 2014 at paras 77-80. 
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‘thumb on the scales’ in terms of weighing the value of that right against the possible 
harms to which the unfettered exercise might give rise.54 
 
B. No ‘Thumb on the Scales’ in Religious Dress Cases 
 
When it comes to the manifestation of religion or belief under Article 9 of the ECHR 
(and the expression of religious ‘information and ideas’ under Article 10), the ECtHR 
has tended to grant states a wide MoA.55 The Court’s rationale for this has been the 
great diversity of views across Europe as to the value of religious manifestation, and 
disagreement about the extent to which it should be protected as a fundamental human 
right: 
 
Where questions concerning the relationship between State and religions are at 
stake, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, 
the role of the national decision-making body must be given special 
importance … It is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform 
conception of the significance of religion in society and the meaning or impact 
of the public expression of a religious belief will differ according to time and 
context.56  
 
                                                 
54 The phrase ‘thumb on the scales’ is based on a similar phrase used by Andrew Geddis to convey the 
notion of extra weight being placed in the balance on behalf of a particular interest, as against 
competing interests. See Geddis, ‘Don’t say God on the Radio’ (2004) 9(2) European Human Rights 
Law Review 181 at 189.  
55 See e.g. Murphy v Ireland Application No 44179/98, Merits, 10 July 2003. 
56 Leyla Şahin v Turkey Application No 44774/98, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 10 November 2005 at 
para 109 (emphasis added).  
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The width of the margin of appreciation is connected to the lack of a common 
European understanding of why the right to manifest religion/belief is valued. After 
all, the challenge of providing answers to this question is compounded by the fact that 
religious settlements across Europe, tortuously reached over the last half-millennium, 
reflect vastly different historical, legal and constitutional compromises. Thus, when it 
comes to explaining why legal recognition is accorded to the principle of freedom of 
religion/belief in contemporary Europe there is an absence of consensus, as illustrated 
by the range of very different constitutional models that are to be found across the 
continent.57 
Today, in multi-faith Europe, it is striking that states have been granted a wide 
margin of appreciation in applications brought by minorities (often Muslim women) 
seeking to challenge legal impairments on the right to manifest their faith through 
how they dress. In a long litany of cases the ECtHR has steadfastly refused to find 
violations. They include, amongst many others, cases of primary school teachers and 
university lecturers,58 university students,59 school pupils,60 hospital workers, 61 and 
                                                 
57 On the many different constitutional arrangements in Europe that exist for the protection of religious 
freedom see Cumper and Lewis (eds), Religion, Rights and Secular Society (Edward Elgar, 2011). 
58 Dahlab v Switzerland Application No 42393/98, Admissibility, 15 February 2001; Kurtulmuş v 
Turkey Application No 65500/01, Admissibility, 24 January 2006. 
59 Leyla Şahin v Turkey supra n 56. 
60 Dogru v France Application No 27058/05, Merits, 4 December 2008; Bayrak v France Application 
No 14308/08, Admissibility, 26 June 2009; Aktas v France Application no 43563/08; Gamaleddyn v 
France Application No 18527/08; Ghazal v France Application No 29134/08; Jasvir Singh v France 
Application No 25463/08; and Ranjit Singh v France Application No 27561/08. The law in question is 
Loi 2004-228 of 15 March 2004.  See also Kose and 93 others v Turkey, Application No 26625/02 
Admissibility, 24 January 2006. This last case was dealt with primarily as a right to education matter 
under Article 2 Protocol 1. The part of the decision dealing with Article 9 referred back to its earlier 
Article 1 Protocol 2 reasoning. 
61 Ebrahimian v France Application No 64846/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 26 November 2015.  
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women wearing the face veil in public.62  All have failed in their attempts before the 
ECtHR to challenge restrictions on their dress.63 
The determining factor in all of these cases has been the application of the 
MoA at the point where the balance between the right and the public interest was 
being struck.64 The doctrine has had the effect of blunting the ECtHR’s 
proportionality analysis in the following ways.  First, there has been a repeated lack of 
explanation by the Court as to how the legitimate aim advanced by the state in its 
justification(s) for placing curbs on certain forms of religious attire, has been 
furthered by the measure in question.65  Thus, claims by states about the risks posed 
by certain ‘harms’ caused by religious dress have been accepted by the ECtHR at face 
value with very little, if any, corroborative evidence.66  
                                                 
62 SAS v France Application No 43835/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 1 July 2014; Belcacemi and 
Oussar v Belgium Application No 37798/13, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 11 July 2017; Dakir v 
Belgium Application No  4619/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 11 July 2017. 
63 There have been only a few cases where those claiming the right to wear religious dress or display 
symbols under Article 9 have been successful.  In these cases, however, the penalties were either so 
disproportionate (e.g. the criminalization of merely wearing forms of religious attire in public, Arslan v 
Turkey Application No 41135/98, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 23 February 2010; the conviction of a 
witness in a criminal trial for contempt of court for refusing to remove an Islamic skull cap, Hamidović 
v Bosnia Herzegovina Application No 57792/15, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 5 December 2017), or 
the legitimate aim put forward to justify the restriction was so weak (the corporate image of the 
employer, a multi-national airline corporation, Eweida v UK Application No 51671/10, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 15 January 2013) that any other result would have arguably rendered the right to manifest 
one’s religion or belief under Article 9 a virtual dead letter.  
64 Dahlab, supra n 58 at 13; Şahin, supra n 56 at para 108-9; Dogru, supra n 60 at paras 63 and 75; 
Bayrak, supra n 60 at para 13; Kose, supra n 60  at para 10; SAS, supra n 62 at paras 129-130, 154-7; 
and Ebrahimian, supra n 61 at paras 65-6 and 70; Belcacemi and Oussar, supra n 62 at paras 51 and 
54-5. The admissibility decisions are less fully reasoned than the judgments of the Court on the merits. 
65 See Leigh, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and religious neutrality’ in d’Costa, Evans, 
Modood, Rivers (eds), Religion in a Liberal State (2013) 38 at 57, commenting on Dogru v France. 
66 See, for example, SAS v France n 62 supra and Şahin v Turkey n 56 supra. The dissentient judges in 
these cases made this point: in SAS see the dissent of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom, at paras 13 
and 14; and in Şahin see the dissent of Judge Tulkens, at para 10. 
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Secondly, the Court has repeatedly displayed a distinct propensity to accept 
the proportionality of blanket curbs on forms of dress, without evidence of any actual 
wrongdoing by applicants themselves.  Thus, for example, despite the fact that in 
Şahin v Turkey, which concerned the ban on headscarves in Turkish universities on 
the grounds that it was necessary to prevent the spread of extremism and the 
pressurizing of women, there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant had 
herself  been disorderly, violent, or subversive in terms of seeking to undermine 
gender equality or promote extremist Islamist movements. Nevertheless she was 
caught by the Turkish ban whose justification was upheld on these very grounds. As 
Judge Tulkens (dissenting) pointed out in a comment that could apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to almost any of the Article 9 religious dress cases: 
 
Only indisputable facts and reasons whose legitimacy is beyond doubt − not 
mere worries or fears − are capable of satisfying that requirement and 
justifying interference with a right guaranteed by the Convention. Moreover, 
where there has been interference with a fundamental right ... mere 
affirmations do not suffice: they must be supported by concrete examples 
[which] do not appear to have been forthcoming in the present case.67 
 
The third and, for the purposes of this article, most interesting aspect to these cases is 
that the judicial analysis within them focuses almost entirely on the paragraph 2 
‘limitations-side’ of the scales. Strikingly, there is a marked absence of anything in 
the ECtHR’s judgments that meaningfully captures the importance of the particular 
                                                 
67 Şahin, dissent of Judge Tulkens, at para 5. 
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manifestations of religion or belief to the individuals concerned.68 It is as if the right 
to manifest one’s religion or belief through clothing is just enough to nudge the 
rights-side of the scales downwards, in the sense that it engages Article 9. But there is 
no extra weight added to the rights-side to account for the right-holder’s firm belief in 
the importance of the manifestation through the clothing s/he wears, irrespective of 
whether it is for his/her spiritual well-being, existential comfort, or sense of identity.69 
Consequently, as soon as weight − any weight − is placed in the limitations-side, it 
easily tips the scales towards restriction.  
To develop this point further, the fact that forms of religious dress and related 
symbols are mandated (or so regarded) by articles of faith or holy texts,70 has often 
seemed, in the eyes of the Court, to count against those claiming the right to manifest 
their beliefs in these ways.71 For example, in Dahlab and Şahin, the Court stated that 
the headscarf ‘appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the 
Koran’,72 and that ‘it must be borne in mind the impact which wearing such a symbol, 
which is presented or perceived as a compulsory religious duty, may have on those 
                                                 
68 The ECtHR merely repeats, in every case, its stock phrase about why the content of Article 9 is 
valued: ‘freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic 
society” within the meaning of the Convention. This freedom is, in its religious dimension, one of the 
most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is 
also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable 
from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it’. This phrase 
was first used by the Court in Kokkinakis v Greece Application No 14307/88, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 25 May 1993 at para 31. 
69 Moores, ‘Face veiling in the Netherlands: Public debates and women’s narratives’ in Brems (ed) The 
Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 19 at 30. 
70 See e.g. The Quran 24:31, which provides: ‘Tell the believing woman to cast down their eyes, guard 
their chastity, and not to show off their beauty except what is permitted by the law’. 
71 The Court in SAS did, admittedly, show some signs of rowing back from its earlier position on 
autonomy and dignity: n 62 at para 146.  
72 Dahlab, supra n 58 at 13; and Şahin, supra n 59 at para 111 (emphasis added). 
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who choose not to wear it’.73 Autonomy may be one of human rights’ underpinning 
explanatory principles,74 but it adds very little to the rights-side of the balance due to 
the fact that the mode of dress is, in some quarters, perceived as being less a matter of 
free choice, and more as one of religious obligation.75  
In view of the ECtHR’s restrictive approach, those who have been prevented 
from publicly wearing the religious attire of their choice are likely to have a rather 
jaundiced impression of the Strasbourg human rights model. After all, in the current 
climate of global and regional religious tension,76 the Court’s reluctance to uphold the 
religious dress applications of what are, in essence, mainly Muslim applicants, will be 
seen in some quarters as supporting claims that ‘[t]here is an anti-Muslim wind 
blowing across the European continent’,77 and adding to negative perceptions that 
Muslims are ‘making politically exceptional, culturally unreasonable or theologically 
alien demands upon European states.’78 With the social fabric of Europe changing, 
and the continent now home to a numerically significant population of ‘European 
Muslims’79 – people who are typically more likely to practice their faith and have a 
                                                 
73 Şahin, supra n 59 at para 115 (emphasis added). 
74 For a prominent recent example of how autonomy might be said to provide a key part in the 
underpinning of human rights doctrine see Griffin, ‘First Steps in an Account of Human Rights’ (2001) 
9(3) European Journal of Philosophy 306 at 311; and Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 2008) at 31.  
75 Clearly there are instances of women, say in theocratic states such Iran and Saudi Arabia, being 
required by law to wear certain forms of religious dress. Such compulsion appears incompatible with 
the prohibition of coercion under Article 18(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966).  
76 See e.g. Leiken, Europe’s angry Muslims: The revolt of the second generation (Oxford University 
Press, 2011).  
77 Modood, ‘Muslims and the Politics of Difference’ (2004) 74(1) The Political Quarterly 100 at 100. 
78 Ibid. at 115.  
79 See Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim (The Islamic Foundation, 2013), who argues that the 
presence of large numbers of Muslims in Europe will lead to the establishment of a new Western form 
of Islam. 
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stronger religious identity than their ‘Christian’ neighbours80 – the effect of the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Muslims (and other religious minorities) should not be 
ignored.81 As Europe’s (if not the world’s) foremost human rights court, the ECtHR’s 
rulings have profound legal and moral significance. Yet instead of sending a positive 
message about the value of religious diversity and equal citizenship in a pluralistic 
multi-faith continent, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on religious dress is problematic, for 
it appears to endorse (albeit indirectly) harsh restrictions on religious dress that have a 
disproportionate impact on Muslim women.82 
In the foreseeable future it is perhaps difficult to see the ECtHR departing 
radically from its current approach and scrutinizing the policies of states in religious 
dress cases more intensively.83 However, if it were to do so, how might additional 
weight be placed on the ‘rights-side’ of the scales, so as to require more from states in 
terms of their justifications of curbs on religious dress? It is to these matters that we 
now turn. 
 
4. EMPATHY – AN INSIGHT INTO THE PERSPECTIVE OF OTHERS 
 
A. Why Empathy? 
                                                 
80 See Mustafa, Identity and Political Participation Among Young British Muslims: Believing and 
Belonging (Springer, 2015) at x-xi.  
81 In assessing this impact it should be borne in mind that there are significant differences within 
Muslims communities. On this see Radeljić, ‘How do European Young Muslims View European 
Identity?’ (2016) Issues in Ethnology and Anthropology 6(4) 871, who distinguishes between three 
categories of young Muslim in Europe: traditionalists; neo-traditionalists; and liberals (the smallest 
group). 
82 See Korteweg and Yurdakul, The Headscarf Debates: Conflicts of National Belonging (Stanford 
University Press, 2014) 1. 
83 See e.g. the recent cases brought by women challenging face cover bans in Belgium: Belcacemi and 
Oussar v Belgium, and Dakir v Belgium supra n 62.  
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The ECtHR’s approach to religious dress has attracted criticism from a range of 
scholars.84 Arguably, with religious (and more specifically Islamic) forms of attire 
continuing to generate controversy in many parts of Europe, a new approach is 
urgently needed to tackle this socially divisive issue. In seeking to balance the rights 
of the citizen and the interests of the state in the area of religious dress, we argue that 
the Court should vest the ‘weight’ to be put in the ‘rights-side’ of the balance in the 
principle of empathy.  
By way of introduction to this proposal, there are at least four reasons why we 
focus on ‘empathy’. First, there is general agreement today about the relevance and 
centrality of empathy to human behavior, and according to some neuroscience 
research it may even be hard-wired into our brain’s neural networks.85  Secondly, as 
we have seen, the ability of humans to empathize or identify with the pleasures and 
pains of others has been a central driver in the growth of the ‘civilizing process’ in 
recent centuries, especially with the advent of easily accessible forms of electronic 
communication (e.g. television, cinema and the world-wide-web).86 Thirdly, the 
innate and universal nature of empathy means that it can assist in the promotion of an 
‘us’ rather than ‘them’ narrative87 − an evident necessity for a Europe that is currently 
                                                 
84 See e.g. Howard, supra n 14 at 153-169; Vakulenko, supra n 14 at 80-111; Lewis, ‘What not to wear: 
religious rights, the European Court, and the margin of appreciation’ (2007) 56(2) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 395; Trispiotis, Two interpretations of “living together” in the European 
human rights law (2016) 75(3) Cambridge Law Journal, 580; and Marshall, ‘SAS v France: burqa bans 
and the control of empowerment of identities’ (2015) 15(2) Human Rights Law Review 377. 
85 See Iacoboni, supra n 5; Decety and Ickes supra n 5.  
86 See Pinker, supra n 7 at 213.  
87 See e.g. Modood, supra note 77, at 115, who calls for a ‘rethink’ so ‘that Muslims are not a `Them' 
but part of a plural `Us'’. 
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home to some alienated and marginalized communities.88 And finally, as we saw in 
Part 2 (above), empathy rests very easily with contemporary human rights norms – so 
the barriers to incorporate a degree of empathic reasoning into the adjudicative 
process might not be insurmountable.89  
Our thesis is that the concept of empathy might supplement those values 
which underpin religious freedom (e.g. toleration and autonomy), and be potentially 
useful for the ECtHR in recalibrating the balance between the rights of the citizen and 
the interests of the state. In other words, an increased emphasis on empathy would 
enable the Strasbourg judges to appreciate more effectively the subjective value of 
applicants’ manifestation of their beliefs and, concomitantly, require more by way of 
the state’s justification of restrictions on matters such as religious dress. Just as the 
principle of empathy has influenced justice and moral judgment throughout human 
history,90 so too is it capable of making a positive contribution to an issue of 
contemporary concern such as the permissibility of curbs on religious forms of attire. 
 
B. Empathy and the Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief? 
 
We have seen that the ability of human beings to appreciate life from the perspective 
of others has been integral to the historical emergence and recognition of human 
rights. Furthermore, philosophers such as Richard Rorty have argued that the key to 
                                                 
88 See e.g. Gest, Apart: Alienated and engaged Muslims in the West (Hurst, 2010), and Pauly, Islam in 
Europe: integration or marginalization? (Routledge, 2016). 
89 See McFarland and Mathews, ‘Who cares about human rights?’ (2005) 26(3) Political Psychology at 
365, who argue that empathy has long ‘contributed to the endorsement of human rights ideals’. See 
also Wilson and Brown (eds), Humanitarianism and suffering: The mobilization of empathy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) and Corso, supra n 12. 
90 See Hoffman, ‘The contribution of empathy to justice and moral judgment’, in Eisenberg and 
Strayer, supra n 2 at 47.  
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improving contemporary human rights protection is to eschew rationalist 
foundationalism in favour of a ‘progress of sentiments’, and that this must consist in 
‘an increasing ability to see the similarities between ourselves and people very unlike 
us as outweighing the differences’.91 In this regard Rorty makes reference to the 
‘long, sad, sentimental story which begins “Because this is what it is like to be in her 
situation – to be far from home, amongst strangers”, … or “because her mother would 
grieve for her”’. 92 
However, notwithstanding the above, there remains a problem with using 
empathy as a basis for the protection of human rights generally, and for the right to 
freedom of religion/belief in particular: in short it is that people are usually more 
willing and able to empathize with those who are similar to themselves, rather than 
those who are different or far removed in terms of their location, culture or beliefs.93 
Our shared aversion to pain and suffering may make it relatively easy for us to 
appreciate the perspective of anyone who is enduring serious violations of their rights 
(e.g. murder, rape, torture, slavery, arbitrary detention) because we can imagine, no 
matter who they are, what it would be like to be in their situation. But when it comes 
to others exercising say the right to freedom of religion or belief, such matters tend to 
be much less straightforward.  
                                                 
91 Rorty, supra n 12 at 77.  
92 Rorty, supra n 12 at 80. 
93 A possible explanation for this state of affairs is that, as Conor Gearty points out, emotions are often 
seen to be simply too ‘delicate and fragile’ to provide a solid foundation for such purposes: Gearty, 
supra n 12 at 34.  There is long standing suspicion of the role subjective ‘feeling’ in the supposedly 
rational and objective world of legal adjudication: see e.g. Henderson n 12 supra, 1575; and Corso, 
supra n 12, at 100-4.  See also Nussbaum, supra n 22, for discussion of the classical Stoic argument 
against empathy/compassion as a moral sentiment unworthy of the dignity of both giver and recipient, 
based on false beliefs about external goods.  
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There are several reasons why the fostering of empathy in the area of 
religion/belief can be especially problematic. First, the religions and beliefs of others 
may be very different from our own,94 and related practices (e.g. governing dress, 
diet, personal morality or worship etc) may well be non-comprehensible95 or 
antithetical,96 to non-members of the group. Secondly, adopting an empathic 
perspective when it comes to matters of religion is also difficult because the subject 
matter may be necessarily particular to that individual belief system,97 and certain 
religious beliefs/practices are ‘exclusive’ in the sense of only being truly cognizable 
by co-religionists.98 Thirdly, it is problematic that many religions clearly constrain 
what might be thought of as the circle of empathy by according preference in their 
doctrines to co-religionists,99 or by endorsing holy texts which suggest that those who 
are not ‘of the faith’ will be destined to eternal punishment or damnation.100 And 
finally, taking the perspective of the believer is made all the harder when, as is often 
the case, the religious belief in question appears to be at odds with some of the basic 
tenets of secular liberalism, most notably in relation to controversies whereby certain 
                                                 
94 See Eisenberg and Strayer, supra n 2.  
95 Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion (Polity, 2008) at 143. Indeed, by the same token, the 
beliefs of the atheist in the absence of a divine being/entity or God may be just as incredible to 
religious believers as religious faith is to atheists.  
96 See e.g. Dawkins, The God Delusion (Black Swan, 2006); Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror 
and the Future of Reason (Free Press, 2006); and Hitchens, God Is Not Great (Atlantic Books, 2007). 
97 See Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (Harvard University Press, 2010) at 
106. 
98 The exclusivity of some religious groups is demonstrated by the fact even many ‘mainstream’ 
Christian believers may struggle fully to comprehend all of the teachings and practices of a minority 
Christian sect such as the Exclusive Brethren. On this group see e.g. Bachelard, Behind the Exclusive 
Brethren (Scribe, 2008). 
99 Examples include: the Calvinist doctrine of predestination; the Orthodox Jewish doctrine of 
matrilineal descent; and the continued existence of the crime of apostasy within Islam.  
100 For example, there are several passages in the Bible which warn against the horrors of hell. See e.g. 
Matthew 13:50; Matthew 25:46; Mark 9:43; Jude 1:7; 2 Thessalonians 1:9; and Revelation 21:8. 
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people (e.g. unbelievers, apostates, women, gays, lesbians, transsexuals etc) are 
afforded fewer rights than others. After all, it is difficult to adopt the perspective of 
another person whose fundamental beliefs one regards as being fallacious, 
objectionable or deeply offensive.101  
 The challenge of resolving this problem, and of fostering empathy in matters 
pertaining to religion/belief, is obviously a daunting one. But the key to that challenge 
may lie in the express acknowledgment and recognition of the role that certain core 
beliefs, such as religious (or quasi-religious) ones, tend to play in helping us respond 
to our common human vulnerabilities.102 This is perhaps most typically the case in 
times of crisis (e.g. illness, bereavement, divorce etc) when we are faced with the 
chasm of the unknown and the unknowable, yet it may also be true of matters that 
affect us in our daily lives, about how and why life should be lived.  
 The content of religious beliefs may be particular, but we all have the ability 
to understand what it is to have an ultimate ethical commitment of the kind 
represented by such beliefs. All rational autonomous individuals have the capacity to 
understand the universal need of human beings to make sense of their own existence, 
and will have to confront such questions (albeit to varying degrees) within their own 
lives. For a significant number of people it is religion, rather than secular reason, that 
provides the most compelling answers to these questions − and for some who wish ‘to 
                                                 
101 Taylor, ‘How to define secularism’ Stepan and Taylor (eds) Boundaries of Toleration (Columbia 
University Press, 2014), 70. 
102 On vulnerability and law generally see e.g. Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality 
in the Human Condition’ (2008-2009) 20 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, 1; and Turner, 
Vulnerability and Human Rights (Penn State Univeristy Press, 2006). 
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make sense of their own existence … religion is the only path to a meaning of life’, 
because secular rationalism seems ‘to provide only a dry existence of despair’.103  
 A valuable insight that might be used to address the challenge posed in 
attempting to adopt the perspective of those whose beliefs are radically at odds with 
our own may be found in the work of Timothy Macklem.104  Macklem contends that 
faith − in the sense of a ‘commitment to that which cannot be established by reason, 
or to that which can be established by reason, but is not believed for reason’s sake’ − 
can contribute to human well-being.105 This is the argument that faith is useful when 
we have to confront those areas and situations in our lives where reason falls short 
‘because the information necessary for the evaluation of the options is not only 
unknown, but unknowable’.106 For some people the ‘nature of life and the content of 
morality are unknowable on the basis of reason alone’ and ‘for them faith in the 
beliefs that form the content of religious doctrine is critical to the achievement of 
well-being’.107  With the ability to come to terms with life’s great questions (e.g. life’s 
purpose, the possibility of life after death, the nature of the good) being vitally 
important in the achievement of human wellbeing for those who cannot accept 
rational answers to such matters, Macklem suggests, ‘faith must step in’.108 
                                                 
103 Mahlmann, ‘Freedom and Faith: Foundations of Freedom of Religion’ (2009) Cardozo Law Review 
2473. 
104 Macklem, ‘Faith as a Secular Value’ in Ghanea (ed) Religion and Human Rights, Vol 1 (Routledge, 
2010) 202.  See also Macklem, Independence of Mind (Oxford University Press, 2006).  
105 Ibid. ‘Faith as a Secular Value’ at 230. Compare the related concept of trust. According to Macklem 
trust requires reasons albeit, often, incomplete reasons, ibid. at 235-6. 
106 Ibid. at 237. See also Forst, The Right to Justification (Columbia University Press, 2012) 147-8. 
107 Ibid. at 242-3 (emphasis added). 
108 Ibid. at 247. 
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 This notion, that there will be points in our lives where reason cannot help, is a 
perspective that it is possible for most, if not all, humans to understand.109 We can all 
imagine being in the position of being unable to comprehend a matter of enormous 
significance that affects our well-being.  This ability to recognize the predicament 
brought about by being in the ‘zone’ of the unknowable provides a doorway into 
thinking about religion and belief, both from the perspective of the other and from the 
universal perspective. Moreover, given that this universal human vulnerability is, and 
has been, recognized in numerous different religions, philosophies and systems of 
belief, it may be possible to conceive of freedom of religion/belief as an expression of 
patience with our fellow humans and their diverse ways of dealing with our common 
human frailties. As Matthias Mahlmann argues, given life’s challenges and the need 
to make sense of one’s existence, patience should be afforded to human attempts to 
grapple with such matters, and religious tolerance and freedom of religion/belief are 
‘central normative expressions of [this] necessary patience of humankind with its own 
existential predicament.’110 
 It is our imaginative capacity that enables us to see the world from the 
perspective of the other, and which enables us to understand why such deep 
                                                 
109 The former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, touched on this theme when, commenting 
on the place of religion in contemporary Britain, he said: ‘We are haunted, we need somewhere to put 
certain bits of our humanity and there’s nowhere else except religious language and imagery … The 
piles of flowers that you see on the site of road accidents are the most potent symbols of a society 
haunted by religion and not clear on what to do about it.’ Rowan Williams, ‘Faith in the Public 
Square’, Lecture at Leicester Cathedral, 22 March 2009: 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/817/faith-in-the-public-square-lecture-at-
leicester-cathedral [last accessed 14 December 2017]. 
110 Mahlmann, ‘Freedom and Faith: Foundations of Freedom of Religion’ (2009) 30(6) Cardozo Law 
Review 2473 at 2492. 
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commitments ought to be protected.111 It is this ability to empathize that allows us to 
understand that if we obstruct another person’s method of dealing with matters 
pertaining to universal vulnerability, this constitutes a profound lack of patience and a 
basic interference with their rights.112   
The suggestion sketched out above is hardly new. Several commentators have 
advocated the crucial importance of perspective taking when dealing with disputes 
involving fundamental rights. For example Carl Stychin, in the context of conflicts 
between LGBT and conservative religious groups, draws on the work of Jennifer 
Nedelsky and Hannah Arendt, and advocates the ‘enlarged mentality’ that enables us 
to approach such issues through ‘our imaginative capacity to put ourselves in the 
position of another’.113 Likewise, Martha Nussbaum recommends the cultivation of 
our ‘inner eyes’ and the ‘participatory imagination’, whereby we are able to cultivate 
a ‘displacement of mind, a curious questioning and receptive demeanour’ that enables 
us to imagine how another human being is thinking or feeling about a particular 
matter.114 Perhaps most significantly, Nussbaum adds that ‘[b]y imagining other 
people’s ways of life, we don’t necessarily learn to agree with their goals, but we do 
see the reality of those goals for them’. In other words, we may still profoundly 
                                                 
111 See Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defence of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality 
(Basic Books, 2008) at 52. 
112 See Waldron, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’ (1987) 37(147) Philosophical Quarterly 133 
at 145, and Galston, Liberal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 117.  
113 Stychin, Faith in the Future: Sexuality, Religion and the Public Sphere (2009) 29(4) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 729; Nedelsky, ‘Legislative Judgment and the Enlarged Mentality: Taking Religious 
Perspectives’ in Bauman and Kahana (eds), The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in 
the Constitutional State (Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political 
Philosophy (University of Chicago Press, 1982). See also Malik, ‘Faith and the State of Jurisprudence’ 
in Oliver, Douglas Scott and Tadros (eds), Faith in Law: Essays in Legal Theory (Hart, 2000) 129 at 
145. 
114 Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance (Harvard University Press, 2012) at 140. 
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disagree with these other people, but by contemplating their situation it is made 
apparent to us that ‘other worlds of thought and feeling exist’115 – a potentially 
significant starting point in the process of empathizing with ‘the other’. 
 
C. The Advantages of Shallow Roots and the Principle of Reciprocity 
 
The ideas put forward above concerning empathy, and adopting the perspectives of 
others, have the distinct advantage of not being rooted deeply in what John Rawls 
called exclusive ‘comprehensive doctrines of the good’.116 The philosophical roots are 
shallow. Concerns have been expressed that grounding human or constitutional rights 
in the deep philosophical soil of liberalism may alienate people of faith, and risks 
accusations of cultural imperialism and hyper-individualism.117 Thus, the empathy 
approach has the advantage of being ‘ground up’118 and, because of its philosophical 
‘thinness’, has the capacity to garner support from a broad range of philosophical and 
religious traditions.119 Importantly, in the context of the current discussion, the 
concept of seeing the world from the perspective of the other is central to – or at least 
a significant part of – many of the world’s major faiths and systems of belief. For 
                                                 
115 Ibid. at 144. 
116 Rawls, ‘Political Liberalism – with New Introduction and ‘Reply to Habermas’ (Columbia 
University Press, 1996) at xxv-xxvi. 
117 See e.g. Wolterstorff,‘On Religion, politics and the liberal state’ in Audi and Wolterstorff, Religion 
in the Public Square the place of religious conviction in political debate (Rowman and Littlefield, 
1997) 121; Appiah, ‘Grounding Human Rights’ in Gutman, supra n 12 at 105; and Sunstein, 
Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law, University of Chicago Public Law and 
Legal Theory, working paper 147, January 2007, 13.  
118 The phrase is used by Martha Nussbaum to describe the ‘capabilities approach’: Nussbaum, Women 
and human development: the capabilities approach (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
119 There are parallels with John Rawls’s concept of ‘overlapping consensus’, which he uses to explain 
the common ground that might be possible for those with incompatible, yet reasonable, 
‘comprehensive doctrines’. See Rawls supra n 116 at 1064. 
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example, the Parliament of World Religions, in its 1993 ‘Declaration Toward a 
Global Ethic’, identified the ‘Golden Rule’ as an important common principle:  
 
A principle which is found and has persisted in many religions and ethical 
traditions of human kind for thousands of years: What you do not wish done to 
yourself, do not do to others. Or in more positive terms: What you wish to be 
done to yourself, do to others! This should be the irrevocable, unconditional 
norm for all areas of life, for families and communities, for races, nations and 
religions.120  
 
One of the earliest codifications of this ‘Golden Rule’ was by Confucius in the 5th 
century BCE, who taught the importance of treating others in ways in which they 
themselves would wish to be treated – a principle known as ren.121  Likewise, in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, the injunction that ‘thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’ 
is found in the Old Testament of the Bible,122 while in the New Testament Christ is 
recorded as instructing his followers to ‘do to others as you would have them do to 
you’.123 Similarly, the Golden Rule is demonstrated by its centrality to other world 
                                                 
120 Parliament of World Religions, Declaration toward a Global Ethic (4 September 1993), 7, at 
http://www.parliamentofreligions.org/_includes/FCKcontent/File/TowardsAGlobalEthic.pdf [accessed 
14 December 2017].  See further Epps, The Universal Golden Rule: A Philosopher’s Perspective 
(CreateSpace, 2012); and Neusner and Chilton (eds), The Golden Rule: the Ethics of Reciprocity in 
World Religions (Bloomsbury, 2008). 
121 Analects, 15:23. See Chan, ‘A Confucian perspective on human rights’ in Bauer and Bell (eds), The 
East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 212. 
122 Leviticus 19:17. 
123 Luke 6:31 (NIV).  
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faiths such as Buddhism,124 Hindusim,125 Islam,126 Jainism,127 and Sikhism,128 while it 
evidently underpins influential non-religious forms of belief such as humanism.129  
 An important thread which runs through the ‘Golden Rule’ and much of the 
conception of empathy (outlined above) is reciprocity (i.e. I treat you as I would wish 
you to treat me). Indeed, the importance of reciprocity can be seen through Michael 
Ignatieff’s claim that human rights depend on the ideal of moral reciprocity: 
 
that we judge human actions by the simple test of whether we would wish to 
be on the receiving end. And since we cannot conceive of any circumstances 
in which we or anyone we know would wish to be abused in mind or body, we 
have good reasons to believe that such practices should be outlawed.130  
 
Thus, given that reciprocity is central to the common elements of major world 
religions and equivalent forms of belief (i.e. the ‘Golden Rule’), in the sense that what 
one wishes to be done to oneself should also be done to others, it seems entirely 
legitimate to acknowledge the element of reciprocity in any model which attempts to 
bring an empathic approach into the balancing of religious rights against competing 
concerns. Accordingly, it is argued that ‘reciprocal empathy’ has the potential for 
providing a widely acceptable and universally understandable basis for affording 
                                                 
124 See e.g. Sutta Nipata 705; Udana-Varga 5.18. 
125 See e.g. Mencius Vii.A.4; Mahabharata, Anusasana Parva, 13.8.  
126 See e.g. The Quran, Surah 24 ‘The Light’, verse 22; The Quran, Surah 83 ‘The Dealers in Fraud’, 
verses 1-4. Several hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) also stress the principle of reciprocity.  
127 See e.g. Agamas Sutrakritanga 1.10.13 and 1.11.33. 
128 See e.g. Guru Aranj Devji 259, Guru Granth Sahib. 
129 For example, the British Humanist Association defines the word ‘humanist’ to include someone 
who ‘makes their ethical decisions based on reason, empathy, and a concern for human beings and 
other sentient animals’: See https://humanism.org.uk/humanism/ [accessed 14 December 2017]. 
130 Ignatieff, supra n 12. 
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protection to the right of freedom of religion/belief, on the basis that it reflects a 
patience with our common human vulnerabilities vis-a-vis the unknowable. However, 
the extent to which such a principle could contribute, in practical terms, to the 
adjudication of human rights cases, specifically Article 9 manifestation cases, is a 
crucial question, and it is one that we now seek to address. 
 
5. EMPATHY, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
RELIGIOUS DRESS 
If we return once more to the metaphor of the scales, an empathic approach would 
require a sincere attempt by the ECtHR to appreciate the importance of the particular 
manifestation of religion/belief to the individual or group in question.131 Of course, 
the very fact that the manifestation of religion/belief is enshrined as a human right 
means that the subjective importance to the individual is acknowledged, at least prima 
facie. But without an obvious or demonstrable appreciation of why it is important 
from the perspective of the right(s) holder, it is easily outweighed by the state’s 
arguments for restriction.   
 As a matter of practical adjudication we suggest that the ECtHR should adopt 
a twin track approach. First, it should acknowledge, to a much greater extent than has 
been the case hitherto, the importance of the particular manifestation of religion/belief 
to the individual concerned, and the impact of the restriction upon them. Secondly 
(and concomitantly) we suggest that the reasons given by the state to justify placing 
curbs on manifestations of religion/belief should be subject to detailed scrutiny – a 
proposal that would necessarily entail a diminution in the margin of appreciation 
accorded to states in such cases. 
                                                 
131 See Brems, ‘SAS v France: A Reality Check’ (2016) Nottingham Law Journal 58 at 61. 
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A. Acknowledging the Importance of Religion/Belief to the Individual 
Concerned 
 
In relation to the first point (above), an obvious challenge relates to how it might be 
possible to acknowledge the subjective importance of another person’s beliefs when, 
given the topic of this discussion, their freedom has been constrained by state 
sanctioned curbs on religious dress. This is obviously a difficult task, but useful 
guidance is to be had from the US where the ‘legal storytelling’ or ‘legal narratives’ 
model has been widely credited with increasing awareness about the perspective of 
‘the other’.132 A particular characteristic of this model has been its association with 
empathy,133 and it is an approach which has, for example, allowed the US Supreme 
Court to have made use of ‘empathic narratives’, which have included the 
‘descriptions of concrete human situations [and] the telling of stories of persons and 
human meanings, not [mere] abstractions.’134 Thus, by way of illustration, in the 
ground breaking decision in Brown v Board of Education135 − where racially 
discriminatory educational policies in the US were declared unconstitutional 
−empathic narratives played a significant role because the stories of African 
American school children, presented to the court by Thurgood Marshall, 
demonstrated how the South’s school segregation policy ‘stamped them with a badge 
                                                 
132 See e.g. Scheppele, ‘Foreword: telling stories’ (1988) Michigan Law Review 87, 2099; Abrams, 
‘Hearing the call of stories’ (1991) California Law Review 971; and Farber and Sherry, ‘Telling stories 
out of school: An essay on legal narratives’ (1993) Stanford Law Review 807. 
133 See e.g. Massaro, ‘Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?’ 
(1989) Michigan Law Review 87(8) 2099; Henderson, supra n 12; and Bandes, ‘Empathy, narrative, 
and victim impact statements’ (1996) 63(2) The University of Chicago Law Review 361. 
134 Henderson, supra n 12 at 1592. 
135 Brown v Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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of inferiority’ and ‘put up road blocks in their minds’.136 Moreover, in that case, 
expert psychological evidence was adduced to the court which, inter alia, showed 
how black children often preferred to play with white dolls and frequently perceived 
black dolls in negative terms, thereby illustrating the humiliation and self-hatred 
caused by segregation.137 Therefore, just as there have been claims that the legal 
narratives model has made a valuable contribution to public discourse in an area as 
contentious as that of race in the United States,138 so too might such an approach have 
a positive effect on the controversial issue of religious dress in Europe.  
 Acknowledging the subjective importance of religious practices by listening to 
the stories of believers, and attempting to see the world through their eyes, would 
provide the ECtHR with a much clearer vision of the subjective importance of the 
beliefs being manifested by the person concerned, and of the gravity of the 
consequences of restriction on them. Perhaps the utilization of the findings of 
empirical academic research is an avenue through which the perspectives and 
motivations of believers could be better understood, as well as the impact on them of 
curbs on religious dress. For example, there have been several empirical studies into 
the reasons why women across Europe wish to cover their faces, and these have 
revealed various motivations, including ones relating to spiritual devotion, religious 
identity, and modesty.139 Were the Court expressly to utilize such accounts in its 
                                                 
136 Henderson, supra n 12 at 1597. 
137 Hoffman, supra n 22 at 246. 
138 See e.g. Delgado and Stefancic, ‘Critical race theory: An annotated bibliography’ (1993) Virginia 
Law Review 461; and Bell, ‘Who’s afraid of critical race theory’ (1995) University of Illinois Law 
Review, 893. 
139 See e.g. Zempi, ‘“It's a part of me, I feel naked without it”: choice, agency and identity for Muslim 
women who wear the niqab’ (2016) Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1738. See also the range of studies that 
document women’s experiences across Europe in Brems (ed), The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in 
Europe and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014).   
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judgments, enabling it to glimpse the issues through the believer’s eyes, this would 
almost certainly have the effect of adding weight to the rights-side of the scales.   
 
B. Subjecting Curbs on Manifestations of Religion/Belief to Greater Scrutiny 
 
In direct consequence of the aforementioned contentions, more compelling arguments 
from the state would then be required to outweigh the individual’s right. As 
previously discussed, the ECtHR has hitherto afforded a wide margin of appreciation 
to states, and has been prepared to accept blanket bans on religious dress with little 
indication of either the general harm done by the collective manifestation of 
religion/belief, or proof of ‘bad behavior’ by the individual applicants themselves.140 
However, pursuance of an empathic approach would require that blanket bans on 
certain forms of religious dress, which take no account of the actual behavior or 
threats posed by applicants themselves, would necessarily be treated with caution 
when weighed in the balance against the subjective importance of the manifestation of 
the right.141 Such an approach would mandate a renewed focus on the individual – and 
in relation to claims by the state of ‘general’ harms emanating from the collective 
manifestation in question, an empathy model would evidently require evidence of 
those alleged harms, rather than mere unsubstantiated assertions.142 
                                                 
140 See the discussion in Part 3 above. See also Brems, ibid. at 70. 
141 Chaib, ‘SAS v France: Missed Opportunity to Do Full Justice to Women Wearing a Face Veil’ 
Strasbourg Observers, 3 July 2014, at https://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/03/s-a-s-v-france-
missed-opportunity-to-do-full-justice-to-women-wearing-a-face-veil/ [last accessed 14 December 
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142 It is acknowledged that a potential argument to the contrary is that such an approach would be ‘too 
individualistic’ since the most potent threat may not come ‘from a single individual but from the 
combined effect of all the religious individuals involved’. See McGoldrick, ‘A defence of the margin 
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 In the recent religious manifestation case law of the ECtHR, the seeds of such 
an ‘empathic’ approach have already possibly been sown. In SAS v France, the Court 
took some steps towards acknowledging the perspective of those who are subject to 
the French face cover ban when it acknowledged that the ‘women concerned are … 
obliged to give up completely an element of their identity that they consider 
important, together with their chosen manner of manifesting their religion or 
beliefs’.143 Similarly, the SAS Court declined to accept the French Government’s 
contention that the ban served the aim of protecting equality or dignity144 − holding 
that the state was not entitled to invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that 
is defended by women themselves, and that there was no evidence that the ban on the 
face veil would protect human dignity.145 Furthermore, in an important passage, the 
Court was willing to acknowledge the ‘significant negative impact’ of the ban on 
women who had ‘chosen to wear the full face veil’:146 
 
[T]hey are presented with a complex dilemma, and the ban may have the 
effect of isolating them and restricting their autonomy, as well as impairing 
the exercise of their freedom to manifest their beliefs and their right to respect 
for a private life. It is also understandable that the women concerned may 
perceive it as a threat to their identity.147  
 
                                                                                                                                           
of appreciation and an argument for its application by the Human Rights Committee’ (2016) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 21 at 52. 
143 SAS, supra n 62 at para 139. 
144 Ibid. at 118-12. 
145 Ibid. at para 118-120.  
146 Ibid. at para 146. 
147 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, on the issue of the margin of appreciation the Court said that ‘in delimiting 
[its] …extent … in a given case, the Court must … have regard to what is at stake 
therein’, thereby implying a fresh willingness to look at the actual impact on the 
individual claimant of the measure in question.148  
The ECtHR has also, on rare occasions, been prepared to take on board the 
absence of any actual evidence of possible harm(s). For example, when considering 
Arslan v Turkey – a case that concerned criminal sanctions for wearing religious dress 
in public in order to protect secularism and democracy – the Court referred to the fact 
that there had been ‘no evidence to show that the manner in which the applicants had 
manifested their beliefs by wearing specific clothing … constituted or risked a threat 
to public order or a form of pressure on others’, or that they ‘had sought to exert 
inappropriate pressure on passers-by’.149  
Admittedly, the aforementioned dicta fall short of any real acknowledgment of 
the subjective significance of religious dress to the people concerned.150 Nevertheless 
they could potentially be used as a future judicial entry point into examination of the 
significance of the religious practice to the person concerned and the consequences 
for him/her of its denial, which might in turn enable a more fact sensitive and rigorous 
proportionality analysis. 
 If the ECtHR were to deviate from its current model, and choose to adopt a 
more fact-sensitive approach that reduces reliance on the MoA, there is guidance to 
                                                 
148 Ibid. at 129. 
149 Cited in SAS, ibid. at para 135. See also Eweida and others v UK, supra n 63, at para 94-5, and the 
dissenting opinions of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom in SAS, supra n 62, at paras 13, 17 and 21. 
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be had from two other sources: the domestic constitutional arena, and the forum of 
international human rights law. In relation to the former, attention may be focused on 
the recent judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Headscarf II 
case, which concerned a law of Rhine Westphalia that prohibited political, religious 
and other forms of ideological expression by teachers in state schools where that 
expression had the potential to endanger or disturb state neutrality or peace at 
schools.151 Two Muslim teachers who had been disciplined for their refusal to remove 
their headscarves brought claims under the constitutional right to freedom of faith and 
conscience.152 The Federal Constitutional Court held that the mere abstract possibility 
that state neutrality or peace at school might be endangered could not justify a blanket 
ban on headscarves; only a concrete danger to the values that the state was aiming to 
protect could do so.153 Thus the court, in noting the strong nature of the religious duty 
and associated shame of being required to go about bare-headed, held that the ban 
breached the teachers’ rights to freedom of faith and conscience.154  
 A similar contextual approach, taking account of the actual level of risk posed 
by the individual’s manifestation of belief in question, can be seen in the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s majority judgment in Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite 
Bourgeoys, which concerned the prohibition of a Sikh schoolboy from wearing his 
ceremonial dagger (kirpan) at school pursuant to a blanket ban on weapons in 
                                                 
151 Headscarf II, 1 BvR 471/10; 1 BvR 1181/10, 27 January 2015. See Haupt, ‘The “New” German 
Teacher Headscarf Decision, International Journal of Constitutional Law Blog, March 17 2015 
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schools.155 The prohibition was held to be disproportionate because, amongst other 
things, the risk of the boy himself using his kirpan for violent purposes or of it being 
so used by another pupil was very low.156 The court held that it was vital to bear in 
mind the ‘specific context’ of the situation,157 and concerns relating to safety had to 
be ‘unequivocally established for the infringement of a constitutional right to be 
justified’.158 
Finally, and most recently, in August 2016 the urgent applications judge of the 
Conseil d’État (France’s highest administrative court) suspended a municipal order 
which had been used to prohibit Muslim women from wearing the burkini, because 
the order banned any item of clothing from being worn on the beach that 
demonstrated an obvious religious affiliation.159 The judge held that in order to justify 
curbs on fundamental rights such as those pertaining to freedom of movement and 
freedom of religion or belief such municipal orders had to be adequate, necessary and 
proportionate, and thereby strictly necessary to maintain peace and good order on the 
beach. However, on the facts, because there had been no evidence to suggest that 
                                                 
155 Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite Bourgeoys [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC 6. See also 
Kwazulu-Natal and Others v Pillay (CCT 51/06) [2007] ZACC 21; 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC); 008 (2) 
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26 août 2016 http://www.conseil-etat.fr/Decisions-Avis-Publications/Decisions/Selection-des-
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islamophobie-en-France [last accessed 14 December 2017].  
 43 
peace and good order on the beaches had been jeopardized on account of what had 
been worn by some swimmers (i.e. burkinis), the order would be suspended.  
 It is of course arguable whether such cases should have any bearing on the 
way that the ECtHR conducts its business, for they are decisions of national 
constitutional courts which have more democratic legitimacy and institutional 
competence than the Strasbourg court to deal with sensitive ‘local’ matters upon 
which there is an absence of European consensus. Indeed, these are the very 
arguments that are used to justify the Strasbourg MoA.160 That said, this kind of fact-
sensitive approach, which places much less emphasis on the MoA, can be seen in the 
approach of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) – the body of independent experts 
that monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966) – to the issue of religious dress. Thus, for example, in Bikramjit Singh v 
France, a seventeen year old Sikh pupil had been prevented from wearing a keski 
(mini turban) at school under a French law which, in accordance with the principle of 
secularism, had prohibited the wearing of religious clothes and symbols of religious 
affiliation in public schools and lycées.161 Even though the HRC accepted that the 
relevant French Law ‘served purposes related to protecting the rights and freedoms of 
others, public order and safety’, it held that the state had ‘not furnished compelling 
evidence that, by wearing his keski, the author would have posed a threat to the rights 
and freedoms of other pupils or to order at the school’.162 The HRC stated further that 
it was not convinced that the boy’s expulsion from the school was necessary, or that 
                                                 
160 See Lord Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’ (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 416 at 
429-430, and Thomas, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’ (2014) 34(4) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 729. 
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the dialogue between him and the school authorities ‘truly took into consideration his 
particular interests and circumstances’.163  
 Significantly, in terms of the current discussion, the HRC went on to observe 
that the ‘harmful sanction’ was imposed on the pupil ‘not because his personal 
conduct created any concrete risk, but solely because of his inclusion in a broad 
category of persons defined by their religious conduct.’164 Thus, the HRC held that 
the state had failed to demonstrate how the imposition of curbs on Bikramjit Singh’s 
rights had been either necessary or proportionate to the benefits the state wished to 
achieve.165  
 In these examples, whilst the aforementioned domestic and international 
bodies did not expressly try to step into the shoes of the believers, they recognized the 
sincerity and profundity of the religious belief that was at issue in each case, its 
significance to the claimants, and the drastic consequences of its restriction. 
Moreover, they subjected government arguments for restriction to a much more 
rigorous proportionality analysis than has hitherto been the case at the ECtHR, for 
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they required evidence of both the harm caused in the particular cases before them, 
coupled with a marked reluctance to accept generalized blanket prohibitions without 
evidence of the supposed harms caused by the practice in question. In essence, there 
was a more ‘empathic’ approach, with a clear acknowledgment of the profound 
importance frequently attached to items of religious dress (or related symbols) by 
people of faith.  
 
     6. CONCLUSION   
 
Relatively little has, to date, been published on empathy, human rights and the right to 
freedom of religion or belief. This article, which makes the case for empathy in the 
field of human rights law, aims to rectify this anomaly. It argues that judges should 
adopt a more empathic approach, particularly when adjudicating in areas that are 
synonymous with conflict and division. By way of illustration, it focuses on the 
contentious and topical issue of religious dress, using it as a case-study to demonstrate 
the value and importance of empathy in a contemporary human rights context. 
 The ECtHR has shown a marked reluctant to ‘stand in the shoes’ or empathize 
with those who have submitted applications to it in the area of religious dress. The 
consequences of this in a Europe that is currently home to millions of people who 
wish to manifest their religious beliefs in public through the clothes they wear or 
symbols they display may be profound. After all, with divisive religious dress 
controversies showing little sign of abating, the risk is that unsuccessful applicants 
will be left feeling angry and bitter about their lack of redress in Strasbourg – a state 
of affairs that might, in a socially fragmented continent, potentially even undermine 
the Court’s legitimacy within some (minority) faith communities. Accordingly, it is 
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our contention that the ECtHR needs to move in a new direction, make an empathic 
turn, and show that it takes religious dress seriously. 
 It is the universal quality of empathy which is perhaps its greatest asset. In a 
Europe that is increasingly religiously diverse yet ever more secular in nature, shared 
values are rare. Yet the commonly accepted concept of empathy transcends religious, 
ideological or sectarian boundaries. As a consequence, the notion of empathy offers 
judges (as well as law and policy makers more generally) rich insights into 
contemporary areas of controversy, such as those relating to religious dress. 
 There is of course no single definition of ‘empathy’, a term that is open to 
numerous different interpretations. But in seeking to summarise what is meant by the 
concept of empathy, it may be apposite to return to where we started – Harper Lee’s, 
To Kill a Mockingbird. At one point in the book, the six year old Scout is in 
conversation with her elder brother Jem. Jem affirms boldly that ‘[t]here’s four kinds 
of folks in the world’, and proceeds to differentiate between each category. Scout 
responds by merely stating: ‘Naw, Jem, I think there’s just one kind of folks. 
Folks.’166 For those who would seek guidance to understand what is meant by 
‘empathy’, one need not look far beyond Scout’s pithy and sage reply. 
 
 
 
                                                 
166 Lee, supra n 1, at 247. 
